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Abstract
In this article, we start with a two-player game that models communication under ad-
verse circumstances in everyday life and study it from the perspective of a modal logic of
graphs, where links can be deleted locally according to definitions available to the adver-
sarial player. We first introduce a new language, semantics, and some typical validities.
We then formulate a new type of first-order translation for this modal logic and prove its
correctness. Then, a novel notion of bisimulation is proposed which leads to a character-
ization theorem for the logic as a fragment of first-order logic, and a further investigation
is made of its expressive power against hybrid modal languages. Next, we discuss how
to axiomatize this logic of link deletion, using dynamic-epistemic logics as a contrast.
Finally, we show that our new modal logic lacks both the tree model property and the
finite model property, and that its satisfiability problem is undecidable.
Keywords: Graph Game, Modal Logic, Dynamic Logic, Link Deletion, Undecidability
1 Introduction
In the graph of the World-Wide Web, to search for relevant and valuable information,
a computer user usually clicks through consecutive hyperlinks passing through interme-
diate web pages. However, hyperlinks do not always work: say, because of technical
malfunctions, or more interestingly, intentional obstruction. Such scenarios of search un-
der adverse circumstances are quite common, and formally, they can be modeled as non-
cooperative games played on graphs. For instance, consider the following web graph:
1
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i
s
v
u
t
g
In this picture, nodes stand for web pages, directed arrows are hyperlinks, and the two
kinds of shape, square and circle, denote two different properties of web pages. One
player E, the user in the above scenarios, starts at point i, and tries to arrive at one of the
goal points t and g. The other playerA, say, Nature or some intentional opponent, tries to
prevent this. The game goes in rounds: A first cuts one or more links in the graph, then
E makes a step along some still available link. Since A can cut at most 8 links in all, the
game is finite. E wins if she gets to the goal region, and loses if she cannot get there.
This description still leaves the game underspecified, since we must say more about
how player A is allowed to cut before we can analyze the outcomes of the game. For
concreteness, we start with a variant where the properties are not yet essential.
First Version PlayerA cuts one arrow fromE’s current position to some reachable node.
In the resulting game on our graph, player E has a winning strategy: she is always
able to find the information that she needs. PlayerAmight start by deleting the link 〈i, s〉,
then E moves to node v. In the second round, A must cut 〈v, g〉, and E goes to state u.
Finally, player E can always arrive at t or g whatever link A deletes.
In this first version, the game is a local variant of the sabotage game (SG) in [10].
A sabotage game is played on a graph by two players: in each round, Traveler acts in
the same way as E, while A’s counterpart Demon first cuts a link. However, Demon’s
moves in sabotage games are global and allow cutting a link anywhere in the graph, not
necessarily starting at the current position of Traveler. In contrast, our game restricts the
moves available to Demon, giving him fewer winning strategies in general (cf. [5]).
However, the real-world scenarios that we considered suggest a more drastic deviation
from existing sabotage games. In many cases of obstruction, the hostile opponent can cut
more than one link, following a recipe rather than some arbitrary choice. For instance,
blocking of links between computers is usually done by a program working on some
explicit description of the targets to be blocked. Or for another concrete illustration of
locality and definability, agents in a social network can cut friendship links starting with
themselves, and they will often do that cutting according to some rule, such as ‘delete all
links to people that have proved to be dishonest’.
Our next game models such more realistic scenarios, taking care of both aspects.
Definitive Version In each round, player A chooses an available atomic property, and
cuts all links from the position of E to nodes with the chosen property.
For example, in the above graph, whenE is located at node s,A can cut both the links
〈s, u〉 and 〈s, t〉 if he chooses the definable property of nodes marked by the square.
Clearly, with this new version, A’s powers of blocking access to information have
increased. Indeed, on the same graph as before, he now has a winning strategy. In the first
Losing Connection: the Modal Logic of Definable Link Deletion 3
round, A cuts the link 〈i, v〉, and E’s only option is to move to node s. But then, A can
cut both links 〈s, u〉 and 〈s, t〉 simultaneously, and E gets stuck and loses.
We will now focus on the logical analysis of our second more realistic game, calling
it the definable sabotage game, denoted SdG. Here existing modal logics for sabotage
can serve as an inspiration, given the similarity of the games. But they must be modified,
since we have made the obstructing player both less powerful (given the local nature of his
choices) and more powerful (since he can remove more than one link in general). More
concretely, to analyze the sabotage game, [5] presents a sabotage modal logic (SML) ex-
tending standard modal logic with a modality ϕ stating that ϕ is true at the evaluation
point after removing some accessibility arrow from the model. But what is a suitable
logic for SdG? The next section contains our proposal, called definable sabotage modal
logic (SdML). We will study this logic in depth, not just for its connections to the above
games, but also as a pilot study for throwing light on what is special and what is general
about sabotage games, and the logical theory that already exists for them. In addition,
our logic is a test case for how local sabotage, even though definable in ways reminis-
cent of dynamic-epistemic logics of information update, has its own behavior, including
significantly higher complexity (cf. [9]).
Outline of the Paper. In Section 2, we present the syntax and semantics of SdML (Section
2.1), and some typical logical validities (Section 2.2). In Section 3, we describe the non-
trivial first-order translation for SdML and check its correctness. In Section 4, we first
introduce a notion of bisimulation for SdML and investigate some of its model theory
(Section 4.1), then we prove a characterization theorem for SdML as a fragment of first-
order logic that is invariant for the bisimulation introduced (Section 4.2), and finally we
explore the expressive power of SdML (Section 4.3). In Section 5, we provide some
further analysis of an axiomatization of SdML. In particular, we illustrate the relation
between SdML and hybrid logics (Section 5.1), and study recursion axioms (Section 5.2).
Next, in Section 6, we show that SdML lacks both the tree model property and the finite
model property, and that the satisfiability problem for SdML is undecidable. Finally, we
discuss related work in Section 7, and conclude in Section 8 with a summary and outlook.
2 Language, Semantics and Logical Validities
In this section, we introduce the syntax and semantics of SdML. After that, to understand
the new device, we illustrate some properties of the logic by means of logical validities.
2.1 Language and Semantics
As mentioned above, the definable sabotage modal logic SdML is intended to match SdG.
Therefore its language should be expressive enough to model the actions of the players.
For player E, it is natural to think of the standard modality 3, which characterizes the
transition from a node to its successors (see [14]). However, to characterize the action of
A, some dynamic operator is indispensable.
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The language Ld of SdML is a straightforward extension of the standard modal lan-
guage L2. In addition to the modality 3, it also includes a dynamic modal operator [− ].
The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 1 (Language). Let P be a countable set of propositional atoms. The formulas
of Ld are defined by the following grammar in Backus-Naur Form:
Ld ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | 2ϕ | [−ϕ]ϕ
where p ∈ P. Besides, notions⊤, ⊥, ∨,→ and 3 are as usual. For any [−ϕ]ψ ∈ Ld, we
define 〈−ϕ〉ψ := ¬[−ϕ]¬ψ, i.e., 〈− 〉 is the dual operator of [− ].
We will often omit parentheses when doing so ought not cause confusion. The op-
erator [− ] is our device to model the action of A in SdG. This can be clarified by
the semantics of SdML. Formulas of Ld are evaluated in standard relational models
M = 〈W,R, V 〉, where W is the domain, a non-empty set of states, nodes or points,
R ⊆ W 2 is the set of accessibility relations or links between points, and V : P → 2W
is the valuation function. A pair F = 〈W,R〉 is called a frame. For each w ∈ W ,
〈M, w〉 is a pointed model. For brevity, we usually writeM, w instead of 〈M, w〉. For
any 〈w, v〉 ∈ R, we also write 〈w, v〉 ∈ M. Besides, we use R(w) to denote the set
{v ∈ W | 〈w, v〉 ∈ R} of successors of w. We now introduce the semantics, which is
defined inductively by truth conditions.
Definition 2 (Semantics). Given a pointed model 〈M, w〉 and a formula ϕ of Ld, we say
that ϕ is true inM at w, written asM, w  ϕ, when
M, w  p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w  ¬ϕ iff M, w 6 ϕ
M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w  ϕ andM, w  ψ
M, w  2ϕ iff for each v ∈ W, if Rwv, thenM, v  ϕ
M, w  [−ϕ]ψ iff M|〈w,ϕ〉, w  ψ
whereM|〈w,ϕ〉 = 〈W,R \ ({w} × V (ϕ) ∩ R(w)), V 〉 = 〈W,R \ ({w} × V (ϕ)), V 〉 is
obtained by deleting all links from w to the nodes that are ϕ.
We say that formula ϕ is satisfiable if there exists a pointed model 〈M, w〉 such that
M, w  ϕ. By Definition 2, the truth conditions for Boolean and modal connectives ¬,
∧, 2 are as usual, and [−ϕ]ψ means that ψ is true at the evaluation point after delet-
ing all accessibility relations from the current point to the nodes that are ϕ. Besides,
we say that two pointed models 〈M1, w〉 and 〈M2, v〉 are ϕ-sabotage-related (notation,
〈M1, w〉
−ϕ
−−→ 〈M2, v〉) iff 〈M2, v〉 is 〈M1|〈w,ϕ〉, w〉. Intuitively, by the semantics, for-
mula ϕ occurring in [− ] stands for a property of some successors of the current point,
and [−ϕ] is exactly an action of player A in SdG.
Example Revisited. Recall the graph at the outset. Assume that the propositional atoms
p and q refer to the properties denoted with circle and square respectively. Then we are
able to express the facts of the game with formulas of Ld. For instance, that ‘after A
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deletes the links from v to the circle point, i.e., g, E still can move to a square node, i.e.,
u’ can be expressed as the truth at v of the formula [−p]3q. Besides, Ld can also define
the existence of winning strategies for players. For example, the formula [−p]2[−q]2⊥
states that A can stop E successfully by removing the links from the position of E to the
circle nodes in the first round, and cutting the links pointing to the square nodes in the
second round. By our semantics for these formulas, SdML captures SdG precisely.
2.2 Logical Validities
Although the language and semantics of SdML look simple, there are some issues with
the new operator [− ]. To illustrate how it works, we explore some interesting validities
of SdML. First of all, let us consider the following principle:
[−ϕ](ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ ([−ϕ]ϕ1 → [−ϕ]ϕ2) (1)
which follows from the semantics of SdML directly. The formula enables us to distribute
[− ] over an implication. It is a common principle that applies to almost all modalities,
e.g. the standard modality and the public announcement operator (see, e.g. [6]). However,
operator [− ] also has some distinguishing features. For instance, the validity
[−ϕ]ψ ↔ 〈−ϕ〉ψ (2)
illustrates that [− ] is self-dual and—less obviously—amodel update function essentially.
It is not hard to check that the validity of formulas (1) and (2) is closed under substitution.
Interestingly, this is not a common feature of SdML. Some examples are as follows:
[−ϕ]p↔ p (3)
[−p]3q ↔ 3(¬p ∧ q) (4)
[−p][−q]ϕ↔ [−q][−p]ϕ (5)
Principle (3) illustrates that operator [− ] does not change the truth value of propositional
atoms. Formula (4) allows us to reduce a formula including [− ] to an L2-formula. By
(5), when all formulas occurring in [− ] are propositional atoms, the order of different
operators [− ] can be interchanged.
Actually each propositional atom occurring in formulas (3)-(5) can be replaced by any
Boolean formula without affecting their validity. However, these schematic validities fail
in general when we consider the deletions for complex properties. As an example, we
show this phenomenon for principle (5).
Example 1. Consider the general schematic form [−ϕ1][−ϕ2]ϕ↔ [−ϕ2][−ϕ1]ϕ for the
principle (5). Let ϕ1 := p, ϕ2 := 33p, and ϕ := 3q. Define a modelM as follows:
w
v1p v2 q
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By inspection, one sees that M, w  [−p][−33p]3q and M, w 6 [−33p][−p]3q.
Therefore it holds thatM, w 6 [−p][−33p]3q↔ [−33p][−p]3q.
Many instances of validity in SdML are not straightforward, and require much more
thought than the often rather obvious validities found in standard logical systems. In
particular, the dynamic modality [− ] creates interesting complexity, since removing a
link in a model can have side-effects for truth values of formulas at worlds throughout the
model. Therefore, it is time to make a deeper technical investigation of our logic.
3 First-Order Translation for SdML
Given the semantics of SdML, a natural question is: is SdML axiomatizable? Obviously
the truth conditions for SdML are first-order, so there must be a first-order translation like
that for standard modal logic. In this section, we present a positive answer to the question
by describing a recursive standard translation for SdML.
However we already know from SML that additional arguments may be needed in the
translation: for SML, that extra argument was a finite set of links (see [5]). Interestingly,
finding the translation here requires even more delicate analysis of the extra argument.
To do so, our method is to introduce a new device, being a sequence consisting of
ordered pairs, e.g. 〈v, ϕ〉, to denote the occurrences of [− ] in a formula, where v is a
variable and ϕ is a property of its successors. LetL1 be the first-order language consisting
of countable unary predicates Pi∈N , a binary relation R, and equivalence≡.
Definition 3 (Standard Translation for SdML). Let x be a designated variable, and O
be a finite sequence 〈v0, ψ0〉; ...; 〈vi, ψi〉; ...; 〈vn, ψn〉(0 6 i 6 n), where ψ06i6n is an
Ld-formula and v06i6n is a variable. Then the translation ST
O
x : Ld → L1 is defined
recursively as follows:
STOx (p) = Px
STOx (⊤) = x ≡ x
STOx (¬ϕ) = ¬ST
O
x (ϕ)
STOx (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = ST
O
x (ϕ1) ∧ ST
O
x (ϕ2)
STOx (3ϕ) = ∃y(Rxy ∧ ¬(x ≡ v0 ∧ ST
〈x,⊥〉
y (ψ0))∧∧
0≤i≤n−1
¬(x ≡ vi+1 ∧ ST
〈v0,ψ0〉;...;〈vi,ψi〉
y (ψi+1)) ∧ ST
O
y (ϕ))
STOx ([−ϕ1]ϕ2) = ST
O;〈x,ϕ1〉
x (ϕ2)
The key inductive clauses in Definition 3 concern 3-formulas and [− ]-formulas.
Formula 3ϕ is translated as a first-order formula stating that the current point x has a
successor y which is ϕ, and that this accessibility relation is not deleted by the operator
[− ] indexed in the sequenceO. The first-order translation for [−ϕ1]ϕ2 says that the trans-
lation of ϕ2 is carried out with respect to the sequenceO; 〈x, ϕ1〉, and that this translation
is realized at the current point x.
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According to Definition 3, the index sequence O may become longer and longer, but
it is always finite. For each formulaϕ of Ld, ST
〈x,⊥〉
x (ϕ) yields a first-order formula with
only x free. Now we use an example to illustrate the translation.
Example 2. Consider formula 3[−3p1]2p2. Its translation runs as follows:
ST 〈x,⊥〉x (3[−3p1]2p2) =∃y(Rxy ∧ ¬(x ≡ x ∧ ST
〈x,⊥〉
y (⊥))∧
ST 〈x,⊥〉y ([−3p1]2p2))
=∃y(Rxy ∧ ¬(x ≡ x ∧ ST 〈x,⊥〉y (⊥))∧
ST 〈x,⊥〉;〈y,3p1〉y (2p2))
=∃y(Rxy ∧ ¬(x ≡ x ∧ ST 〈x,⊥〉y (⊥))∧
∀z(Ryz ∧ ¬(y ≡ x ∧ ST 〈x,⊥〉z (⊥))∧
¬(y ≡ y ∧ ST 〈x,⊥〉z (3p1))→ ST
〈x,⊥〉;〈y,3p1〉
z (p2))
=∃y(Rxy ∧ ¬(x ≡ x ∧ ST 〈x,⊥〉y (⊥))∧
∀z(Ryz ∧ ¬(y ≡ x ∧ ST 〈x,⊥〉z (⊥))∧
¬(y ≡ y ∧ ∃z′(Rzz′ ∧ ¬(z ≡ x ∧ ST
〈x,⊥〉
z′ (⊥))∧
ST
〈x,⊥〉
z′ (p1))→ ST
〈x,⊥〉;〈y,3p1〉
z (p2))
=∃y(Rxy ∧ ¬(x ≡ x ∧ ¬y ≡ y) ∧ ∀z(Ryz∧
¬(y ≡ x ∧ ¬z ≡ z) ∧ ¬(y ≡ y ∧ ∃z′(Rzz′∧
¬(z ≡ x ∧ ¬z′ ≡ z′) ∧ P1z
′)→ P2z)
The result is much complicated. Actually, it is equivalent to formula ∃y(Rxy ∧
∀z(Ryz∧¬∃z′(Rzz′∧P1z′)→ P2z)), which states that there exists a successor y of the
current point x such that, for each successor z of y, if z does not has any P1-successors,
then z is P2. Example 2 can be considered as a small case illustrating that SdML is suc-
cinct notation for a complex part of first-order logic. In order to check the result, we now
prove the correctness of Definition 3.
Theorem 1 (Correctness of the Standard Translation). Let 〈M, w〉 be a pointed model
and ϕ be a formula of Ld, then
M, w  ϕ iff M  ST 〈x,⊥〉x (ϕ)[w].
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ. The cases for Boolean and modal
connectives are straightforward. When ϕ is [−ϕ1]ϕ2, the following equivalences hold:
M, w  [−ϕ1]ϕ2 iff ∃M
′ s.t.〈M, w〉
−ϕ1
−−−→ 〈M′, w〉 andM′, w  ϕ2
iff ∃M′ s.t.〈M, w〉
−ϕ1
−−−→ 〈M′, w〉 andM′  ST 〈x,⊥〉x (ϕ2)[w]
iff M  ST 〈x,⊥〉;〈x,ϕ1〉x (ϕ2)[w]
iff M  ST 〈x,⊥〉x (ϕ)[w]
The first equivalence follows from the semantics directly. By the inductive hypothesis,
the second one holds. The last two equivalences hold by Definition 3.
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Remark 1. The first-order translation for SdML is quite different from that for SML.
To translate a SML formula, it suffices to maintain a finite set of ordered pairs of nodes
encoding the links already deleted (cf. [5]). However it fails for SdML, since the number
of links cut by [− ] may be infinite. Besides, Example 1 shows that we should also take
care of the order of [− ] in a formula. Our finite sequence of ordered pairs of nodes and
properties solves these problems and yields a translation for SdML.
Finally, we end by answering the question stated at the outset of this section, which
follows directly from Definition 3 and Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. By the completeness theorem for first-order logic, SdML is axiomatizable.
4 Bisimulation and Expressivity for SdML
Through the standard translation, we can translate a formula of SdML into first-order logic
syntactically. In this section, we investigate the other aspect, i.e., model theories, for its
expressive power. Let us begin with considering the notion of bisimulation for SdML.
4.1 Bisimulation for SdML
After expanding the standard modal language L2 with the operator [− ], formulas of Ld
are not invariant under the standard bisimulation any longer (cf. [14]).
To show this, we first introduce a notion of definable sabotage modal equivalence
(notation,!d) between pointed models: 〈M1, w〉 !d 〈M2, v〉 iff for each ϕ ∈ Ld,
M1, w  ϕ iffM2, v  ϕ.
Fact 1. Formulas of Ld are not invariant under the standard bisimulation.
Proof. It suffices to give an example. Consider two modelsM1 andM2 that are defined
as depicted in the following figure:
w1
p
w2
p
w3q
v1 p
v2 p
Z
Z
Z
By the definition of standard bisimulation, we know that both 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M1, w2〉
are bisimilar to 〈M2, v1〉, and that 〈M1, w3〉 is bisimilar to 〈M2, v2〉. However, we have
M1, w1  [−q]33q and M2, v1 6 [−q]33q. Therefore bisimulation does not imply
definable sabotage modal equivalence.
What is a suitable notion of bisimulation for SdML? Now we introduce a new notion
of definable sabotage bisimulation (d-bisimulation). Here is the formal definition.
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Definition 4 (d-bisimulation). LetM1 = 〈W1, R1, V1〉 andM2 = 〈W2, R2, V2〉 be two
models. A non-empty relation Zd is a d-bisimulation between pointed models 〈M1, w〉
and 〈M2, v〉 (notation, Zd : 〈M1, w〉↔d〈M2, v〉) if the following five conditions are
satisfied:
Atom: If 〈M1, w〉Zd〈M2, v〉, thenM1, w  p iffM2, v  p, for each p ∈ P.
Zig3: If 〈M1, w〉Zd〈M2, v〉 and there exists w′ ∈ W1 such that R1ww′, then there
exists v′ ∈W2 such that R2vv′ and 〈M1, w′〉Zd〈M2, v′〉.
Zag3: If 〈M1, w〉Zd〈M2, v〉 and there exists v
′ ∈ W2 such that R2vv
′, then there
exists w′ ∈W1 such that R1ww′ and 〈M1, w′〉Zd〈M2, v′〉.
Zig[− ]: For each ϕ ∈ Ld, if 〈M1, w〉Zd〈M2, v〉 and there exists M
′
1 such that
〈M1, w〉
−ϕ
−−→ 〈M′1, w〉, then there exists M
′
2 such that 〈M2, v〉
−ϕ
−−→ 〈M′2, v〉 and
〈M′1, w〉Zd〈M
′
2, v〉.
Zag[− ]: For each ϕ ∈ Ld, if 〈M1, w〉Zd〈M2, v〉 and there exists M
′
2 such that
〈M2, v〉
−ϕ
−−→ 〈M′2, v〉, then there exists M
′
1 such that 〈M1, w〉
−ϕ
−−→ 〈M′1, w〉 and
〈M′1, w〉Zd〈M
′
2, v〉.
For brevity, we write 〈M1, w〉↔d〈M2, v〉 if there exists a d-bisimulationZd such that
〈M1, w〉Zd〈M2, v〉.
Here the conditions for 3 are as usual, and they do not change the model but change
the evaluation point along the accessibility relation. While, the conditions for [− ] keep
the evaluation point fixed but remove some links from the model. In the standard modal
logic, given any two modelsM and N , there always exists a bisimulation called largest
bisimulation, i.e., the set-theoretic union of all bisimulation relations betweenM and N
(see [8]). By Definition 4, it is not hard to see that this also holds for the new notion: for
any two models, there is a largest d-bisimulation between them. This result is useful in
various aspects, say, it can help us to simplify given models to smaller equivalent ones.
As a concrete illustration of the notion introduced here, it is easy to see that the pointed
models 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, v1〉 in the proof of Fact 1 are not d-bisimilar.
Next we show that formulas of SdML are invariant for d-bisimulation:
Theorem 2 (↔d ⊆!d). For any 〈M1, w〉 and 〈M2, v〉, if 〈M1, w〉↔d〈M2, v〉, then
〈M1, w〉!d 〈M2, v〉.
Proof. We prove it by induction on the syntax of ϕ. Let 〈M1, w〉↔d〈M2, v〉.
(1). ϕ ∈ P. By Definition 4, it holds directly thatM1, w  ϕ iffM2, v  ϕ.
(2). ϕ is ¬ψ. By the inductive hypothesis,M1, w  ψ iffM2, v  ψ. Consequently,
we know thatM1, w  ϕ iffM2, v  ϕ.
(3). ϕ is ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2. By the inductive hypothesis, for each i ∈ {1, 2},M1, w  ϕi iff
M2, v  ϕi. Thus it holds thatM1, w  ϕ iffM2, v  ϕ.
(4). ϕ is 3ψ. If M1, w  ϕ, then there exists w1 ∈ W1 such that R1ww1 and
M1, w1  ψ. By Zig3, there exists v1 ∈ W2 s.t. R2vv1 and 〈M1, w1〉↔d〈M2, v1〉. By
the inductive hypothesis, M1, w1  ψ iff M2, v1  ψ. It is followed by M2, v1  ψ
immediately. Consequently it holds thatM2, v  ϕ. Similarly, we can obtainM1, w  ϕ
fromM2, v  ϕ by Zag3.
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(5). ϕ is [−ϕ1]ϕ2. IfM1, w  ϕ, then there is aM′1 s.t. 〈M1, w〉
−ϕ1
−−−→ 〈M′1, w〉
andM′1, w  ϕ2. By Zig[− ], there is someM
′
2 such that 〈M2, v〉
−ϕ1
−−−→ 〈M′2, v〉 and
〈M′1, w〉↔d〈M
′
2, v〉. By the inductive hypothesis,M
′
1, w  ϕ2 iffM
′
2, v  ϕ2. Hence
it holds thatM2, v  ϕ. Similarly, by Zag[− ],M1, w  ϕ follows fromM2, v  ϕ.
As an application of Theorem 2, let us consider a simple example:
Example 3. Consider two modelsM1 andM2 defined respectively as follows:
w1
w2
v
By Definition 4, it holds that 〈M1, w1〉↔d〈M2, v〉 and 〈M1, w2〉↔d〈M2, v〉 (the d-
bisimulation runs via the dashed lines). From Theorem 2, we know that 〈M1, w1〉!d
〈M2, v〉 and 〈M1, w2〉 !d 〈M2, v〉. Therefore, SdML cannot distinguish between
nodes w1(2) and v.
Furthermore, for ω-saturated models, the converse of Theorem 2 holds as well. For
each finite set Y , we denote the expansion of L1 with a set Y of constants with LY1 , and
denote the expansion ofM to LY1 withM
Y .
Definition 5 (ω-saturation). A modelM = 〈W,R, V 〉 is ω-saturated if, for every finite
subset Y of W , the expansionMY realizes every set Γ(x) of LY1 -formulas whose finite
subsets Γ′(x) are all realized inMY .
Not all models are ω-saturated, but every model can be extended to an ω-saturated
model with the same first-order theory (see [16]). From Definition 3, we know that each
model M has an ω-saturated extension with the same theory of SdML. For brevity, we
use the set Td(M, w) = {ϕ ∈ Ld | M, w  ϕ} of Ld-formulas to denote the theory of
w inM. By Definition 5, we have the following result.
Theorem 3 (!d⊆ ↔d). For any two ω-saturated pointedmodels 〈M1, w〉 and 〈M2, v〉,
if 〈M1, w〉!d 〈M2, v〉, then 〈M1, w〉↔d〈M2, v〉.
Proof. We prove this by showing that!d satisfies the definition of d-bisimulation.
(1). For each p ∈ P, by the definition of!d, it holds thatM1, w  p iffM2, v  p.
This satisfies the condition of Atom.
(2). Let w1 ∈ W1 such that R1ww1. We show that point v has a successor v1 with
〈M1, w1〉!d 〈M2, v1〉. For each finite subset Γ of Td(M1, w1), it holds that:
M1, w  3
∧
Γ iff M2, v  3
∧
Γ
iff M2  ST
〈x,⊥〉
x (3
∧
Γ)[v]
iff M2  ∃y(Rxy ∧ ST
〈x,⊥〉
y (
∧
Γ))[v]
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Therefore every finite subset Γ of Td(M1, w1) is satisfiable in the set of successors of
node v. From Definition 5, we know that v has a successor v1 where T
d(M1, w1) is true.
Thus, 〈M1, w1〉!d 〈M2, v1〉. The proof of the Zig3 clause is completed.
(3). Similar to (2), we can prove that the condition of Zag3 is satisfied.
(4). Let 〈M′1, w〉 be a pointed model and ϕ ∈ Ld such that 〈M1, w〉
−ϕ
−−→ 〈M′1, w〉.
We prove the Zig[− ] clause by showing there existsM
′
2 with 〈M2, v〉
−ϕ
−−→ 〈M′2, v〉 and
〈M′1, w〉!d 〈M
′
2, v〉. For each finite subset Γ of T
d(M′1, w), the following sequence
of equivalences holds:
M1, w  [−ϕ]
∧
Γ iff M2, v  [−ϕ]
∧
Γ
iff M2  ST
〈x,⊥〉
x ([−ϕ]
∧
Γ)[v]
iff M2  ST
〈x,⊥〉;〈x,ϕ〉
x (
∧
Γ)[v]
Hence each finite subset of Td(M′1, w) is true at 〈M
′
2, v〉, where 〈M2, v〉
−ϕ
−−→ 〈M′2, v〉.
By Definition 5, Td(M′1, w) is true at 〈M
′
2, v〉. It is followed by 〈M
′
1, w〉!d 〈M
′
2, v〉.
(5). Similar to (4), we can show that the condition of Zag[− ] is satisfied.
Thus, we conclude that 〈M1, w〉↔d〈M2, v〉. The proof is completed.
4.2 Characterization of SdML
By the notion of d-bisimulation, we can characterize SdML as the one-free-variable frag-
ment of FOL that is invariant for d-bisimulation, where a first-order formula α(x) is in-
variant for d-bisimulationmeans that for all pointed models 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 such
that 〈M1, w1〉↔d〈M2, w2〉, it holds thatM1  α(x)[w1] iffM2  α(x)[w2].
Theorem 4 (Characterization of SdML by d-bisimulation Invariance). An L1-formula is
equivalent to the translation of an Ld-formula iff it is invariant for d-bisimulation.
Proof. The direction from left to right holds directly by Theorem 2. For the converse
direction, let α be an L1-formula with one free variable x. Assume that α is invariant for
d-bisimulation. Now we consider the following set:
Cd(α) = {ST
〈x,⊥〉
x (ϕ)|ϕ ∈ Ld and α  ST
〈x,⊥〉
x (ϕ)}.
The result holds from the following two claims:
(i). If Cd(α)  α, then α is equivalent to the translation of an Ld-formula.
(ii). Cd(α)  α, i.e., for any pointed model 〈M, w〉,M  Cd(α)[w] entailsM  α[w].
We show (i) first. Suppose that Cd(α)  α. From the compactness and deduction
theorems of first-order logic, it holds that 
∧
Γ → α for some finite subset Γ of Cd(α).
The converse can be shown by the definition of Cd(α):  α →
∧
Γ. Thus it holds that
 α↔
∧
Γ proving the claim.
As to the claim (ii), let 〈M, w〉 be a pointed model such thatM  Cd(α)[w]. Con-
sider the set Σ = ST
〈x,⊥〉
x (Td(M, w)) ∪ {α}. We now show that:
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(a). The set Σ is consistent.
(b). M  α[w], thus proving claim (ii).
Suppose that Σ is not consistent. By the compactness of first-order logic, it follows
that  α→ ¬
∧
Γ for some finite subset Γ of Σ. But then, by the definition of Cd(α), we
obtain ¬
∧
Γ ∈ Cd(α), which is followed by ¬
∧
Γ ∈ ST
〈x,⊥〉
x (Td(M, w)). However, it
contradicts to Γ ⊆ ST
〈x,⊥〉
x (Td(M, w)). Hence (a) holds.
Now we show that (b) holds as well. Since Σ is consistent, it can be realized by some
pointed model, say, 〈M′, w′〉. Note that both the pointed models have same theories,
thus 〈M, w〉!d 〈M
′, w′〉. Now take two ω-saturated elementary extensions 〈Mω, w〉
and 〈M′ω, w
′〉 of 〈M, w〉 and 〈M′, w′〉 respectively. It can be shown that such extensions
always exist (see [16]). By the invariance of first-order logic under elementary extensions,
fromM′  α[w′] we knowM′ω  α[w
′]. Moreover, by Theorem 3 and the assumption
that α is invariant for d-bisimulation, we haveMω  α[w]. By the elementary extension,
we obtainM  α[w] that entails the claim (ii). Consequently, the proof is completed.
Just as with SML, the key model-theoretic argument using saturation needed special
care, but now with new modifications matching the above translation of SdML (cf. [5]).
4.3 Exploring Expressive Power
So far, we have already been able to show whether or not a first-order property belongs
to the fragment identified by Theorem 4. In this section, we show several concrete exam-
ples, which will also present a comparison between SdML and SML with respect to their
expressive power on models.
Example 4. Consider the first-order property α1(x) ‘The current point is irreflexive and
not a dead end. Each of its successors only has access to it’, i.e., α1(x) := ¬Rxx ∧
∃yRxy ∧ ∀y(Rxy → Ryx ∧ ∀z(Ryz → z ≡ x)). From Example 3, we know that this
property is not invariant for d-bisimulation. For instance, formula α1(x) is true at state
w1 inM1 but fails at v inM2. Thus this property is not definable in SdML.
Interestingly, the result may be quite different if we change the first-order property in
Example 4 slightly, say,
Fact 2. The first-order property α+1 (x) ‘The current point is irreflexive and not a dead
end. Some of its successors are dead ends, the others only have access to dead ends and
the current point’, i.e., α+1 (x) := ¬Rxx ∧ ∃y(Rxy ∧ ¬∃zRyz) ∧ ∃y(Rxy ∧ ∃zRyz) ∧
∀y(Rxy → ¬∃zRyz ∨ (Ryx∧ ∃z(Ryz ∧ ¬∃uRzu)∧ ∀z(Ryz → z ≡ x ∨ ¬∃uRzu))),
is definable in SdML.
Proof. Consider the following formulas of SdML:
(B1) 32⊥ ∧33⊤
(B2) 2(3⊤ → 32⊥ ∧3(32⊥∧33⊤) ∧ 2(2⊥ ∨ (32⊥ ∧33⊤)))
(B3) [−2⊥]2(32⊥ ∧2(¬2⊥ → ¬32⊥))
Losing Connection: the Modal Logic of Definable Link Deletion 13
Let ϕ+1 := (B1 ∧B2 ∧B3). This formula is satisfiable, say, it is true at 〈M1, w1〉 in the
proof of Fact 1. Let 〈M, u〉 be a pointed model. It is not hard to see that M, u  ϕ+1
if M  α+1 (x)[u]. Now assume thatM, u  ϕ
+
1 . Formula (B1) states that, the current
point u has some successors u1 that are dead ends, and some successors u2 which have
successors. By (B2), each u2 reaches some dead end u3, and some point u4 which is
similar to u: it has some successors which are dead ends, and some successors that also
have successors. After cutting the links from node u to the dead ends, from (B3) it holds
that u2 still can see some dead ends, and that u4 cannot reach dead ends any longer.
Therefore we obtain u2 6= u and u4 = u, consequently,M  α
+
1 (x)[u]. So we conclude
thatM  α+1 (x)[u] iffM, u  ϕ
+
1 for any pointed model 〈M, u〉.
Through observation, we can find that the property α+1 (x) expands the current point
and its successors in α1(x) with some successors that are dead ends. But the former one
is definable in SdML and the latter one is not. What is the reason for this?
Suppose that 〈M, u〉 be a pointed model that is d-bisimilar to 〈M1, w1〉 in the proof
of Fact 1. By Definition 4, we know that u can reach some dead end u1, and some u2 that
has access to some dead ends. Except those dead ends, u2 can also see some point u3 that
is similar to u: u3 can reach some dead end and some node that has successors. Further
more, after cutting the links from u to the dead ends, u2 still can see some dead ends, but
u3 cannot reach any dead ends now. So we have u2 6= u and u3 = u. In such a way, we
conclude that the property α+1 (x) is invariant under d-bisimulation.
Example 5. Consider the FOL property ‘There exist n successors of the current point’.
This property is not invariant for d-bisimulation. For instance, in the following models:
w
w2 w1
v
v1
the property ‘there exist 2 successors’ is true at pointw in the model to the left, but it fails
at v to the right. Hence it is not definable in SdML.
In contrast, as noted in [5], SML can count successors of the current state, and it can
also define the length of a cycle. That is, for each positive natural number n, there exists
a SML formula ϕ such that, for anyM = 〈W,R, V 〉 and w ∈ W ,M, w  ϕ iff 〈W,R〉
is a cycle of length n. Is this property definable in SdML?
Example 6. Recall the two models displayed in Example 3. The underlying frame ofM1
is a cycle of length 2, while that ofM2 is a cycle of length 1. So SdML cannot define the
length of a cycle.
Intuitively, these differences between SdML and SML stem from the features of [− ]
and the standard sabotage modality . In SML, each occurrence of  in a formula deletes
exactly one link. While, in SdML, [− ] operates uniformly, which blocks the logic to
define the first-order properties in Example 5-6. However, this does not mean that SdML
is less expressive than SML with respect to models. Actually the notion of bisimulation
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for sabotage modal logic is not an extension of d-bisimulation. When tackling with cases
involving infinite, operator [− ] may show more strength. Here is an example.
Example 7. We establish a model in the following way:
w
v0 v1 · · · vn · · ·
As we can see, node w has countable successors. By the truth condition for [− ], formula
[−⊤]2⊥ is true at node w, which says that all links starting at w are cut by the operator
[− ]. However there is no such a formula ϕ of SML that can do this: each occurrence of
 cuts one link, but the number of  occurring in a formula is always finite.
From Examples 5-7, we then get the following conclusion.
Fact 3. SdML and SML are not comparable in their expressive power on models.
5 From SdML to Hybrid Logics
While an effective first-order translation shows that validity in SdML is effectively axiom-
atizable, it gives no concrete information about a more ‘modal’ complete set of proof prin-
ciples. In this section, following the techniques developed by some dynamic-epistemic
logics (cf. e.g. [6]), we try to axiomatize SdML by means of recursion axioms.
The principles for Boolean cases are as usual. However, as for [−ϕ]2ψ, there is a
problem. From the typical method of recursion axioms used in dynamic-epistemic logic,
we know that dynamic operators can be pushed inside through standard modalities. But it
fails for SdML, since that after pushing [− ] under a standard modality over successors of
the current world, the model change is not local in the successors any longer and it takes
place somewhere else (cf. [5]).
Hence the principle for [−ϕ]2ψ should illustrate the position where the change hap-
pens. To do so, a natural method is to seek help from hybrid logics, which enable us to
name nodes in a model. Consider the hybrid logic with nominals, at operator@ and down-
arrow operator ↓, which is denoted by H(↓). With its formulas of the form ↓ x2 ↓ yϕ,
we can manipulate links by naming pairs of points (see [2]).
5.1 SdML and Hybrid Logics
As a warm-up, we briefly discuss the relation between SdML and hybrid logics. In par-
ticular, the following translation illustrates that SdML can be reduced toH(↓). Similar to
the standard translation, a finite sequence O will be used.
Definition 6 (The Hybrid Translation for SdML). Let O be a finite sequence of pairs of
variables of nominals and properties, denoted with 〈x0, ψ0〉; ...; 〈xi, ψi〉; ...; 〈xn, ψn〉(0 ≤
i ≤ n). The translation TO : Ld → H(↓) is recursively defined in the following way:
TO(p) = p
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TO(⊤) = ⊤
TO(¬ϕ) = ¬TO(ϕ)
TO(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = T
O(ϕ1) ∧ T
O(ϕ2)
TO(3ϕ) = ↓ x3(¬(@xx0 ∧ T
〈x0,⊥〉(ψ0)) ∧∧
06i6n−1
¬(@xxi+1 ∧ T
〈x0,ψ0〉;...;〈xi,ψi〉(ψi+1)) ∧ T
O(ϕ))
TO([−ψ]ϕ) = ↓ xTO;〈x,ψ〉(ϕ)
In fact, the truth value of aH(↓)-formula in some model may depend on the valuation
of nominals occurring in it. However, this is not problematic: by Definition 6, for each
ϕ ∈ Ld, T 〈x,⊥〉(ϕ) yields aH(↓)-formula with no free variables of nominals. For brevity,
we will leave out the assignment of values to variables in models of H(↓) if there is no
ambiguity. Now we show the correctness of Definition 6.
Theorem 5 (Correctness of the Hybrid Translation). Let 〈M, w〉 be a pointed model and
ϕ be a formula of Ld, then
M, w  ϕ iff M, w  T 〈x,⊥〉(ϕ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ. The Boolean cases are straightfor-
ward, and we only show the non-trivial cases.
(1). When ϕ is 3ψ, the following equivalences hold:
M, w  ϕ iff there exists v ∈ W s.t. Rwv andM, v  ψ
iff there exists v ∈ W s.t. Rwv andM, v  T 〈x,⊥〉(ψ)
iff M, w  3T 〈x,⊥〉(ψ)
iff M, w ↓ x3(¬(@xx ∧ T
〈x,⊥〉(⊥)) ∧ T 〈x,⊥〉(ψ))
iff M, w  T 〈x,⊥〉(ϕ)
The first equivalence holds by the semantics of Ld. The second one follows from the
inductive hypothesis. The third and fourth equivalences follow by the semantics ofH(↓).
The last one holds by Definition 6.
(2). When ϕ is [−ϕ1]ϕ2, we have the following equivalences:
M, w  [−ϕ1]ϕ2 iff ∃M
′ s.t.〈M, w〉
−ϕ1
−−−→ 〈M′, w〉 andM′, w  ϕ2
iff ∃M′ s.t.〈M, w〉
−ϕ1
−−−→ 〈M′, w〉 and 〈M′, w〉  T 〈x,⊥〉(ϕ2)
iff 〈M, w〉  T 〈x,⊥〉;〈x,ϕ1〉(ϕ2)
iff 〈M, w〉  T 〈x,⊥〉(ϕ)
The first equivalence follows directly from the semantics of Ld. The second one holds by
the inductive hypothesis. The last two equivalences follow by Definition 6.
Therefore, for each ϕ ∈ Ld, it holds thatM, w  ϕ iffM, w  T 〈x,⊥〉(ϕ).
In the way described, we can reduce SdML to H(↓). But, does the converse direction
hold? First note that the following property is definable inH(↓):
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Fact 4. The property ‘there exist n successors of the current point’ is definable in H(↓).
Proof. We prove it by building the desired formula. Let n be a positive natural number.
Consider the followingH(↓)-formula:
↓ x(3 ↓ x1(@x3 ↓ x2(...(@x3 ↓ xn(@x2(
∨
0≤i≤n
xi ∧
∧
1≤i<j≤n
¬@xixj ))...)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+2
The formula states that the current point x has successors x1, ..., xn, that each node
reachable from x must be some xi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and that for any different i and j
such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, xi is distinct from xj . Thus, there exist n successors of the current
point iff the stated hybrid formula holds at that point.
But Example 5 showed that this property is not definable in SdML.
Fact 5. H(↓) is more expressive than SdML over models.
Therefore SdML can be viewed as a fragment of H(↓). Any hybrid logic at least
as expressive as H(↓) is more expressive than SdML. Even so, the hybrid translation
described in Definition 6 suggests that it may be viable to analyze validity in the logic
SdML with expressive resources similar to those ofH(↓).
5.2 Digression on Recursion Axioms
One attractive format for axiomatizing logics of model change are recursion axioms in
the style of dynamic-epistemic logic (see [9]). As mentioned already, Boolean cases are
available for SdML as well. We begin with the principle for [− ]: 1
Fact 6. Let ϕ, ψ and χ be Ld-formulas. Then it holds that
[−ϕ][−ψ]χ↔↓ x[− ↓ y(ϕ ∨@x[−ϕ]@yψ)]χ (6)
where x and y are new nominal variables.
Proof. Let 〈M, w〉 be a pointed model. We prove it by showing thatM|〈w,ϕ〉|〈w,ψ〉 and
M|〈w,↓y(ϕ∨@x[−ϕ]@yψ)〉 are same, where w ∈ V (x). Suppose not, then there must be
some v ∈W such that 〈w, v〉 ∈ M|〈w,ϕ〉|〈w,ψ〉 and 〈w, v〉 6∈ M|〈w,↓y(ϕ∨@x[−ϕ]@yψ)〉, or
that 〈w, v〉 ∈ M|〈w,↓y(ϕ∨@x[−ϕ]@yψ)〉 and 〈w, v〉 6∈ M|〈w,ϕ〉|〈w,ψ〉.
Now consider the first case. From 〈w, v〉 6∈ M|〈w,↓y(ϕ∨@x[−ϕ]@yψ)〉, we know that
M, v  ϕ ∨ @x[−ϕ]@yψ where v ∈ V (y). By 〈w, v〉 ∈ M|〈w,ϕ〉|〈w,ψ〉, it follows that
M|〈w,ϕ〉, v 6 ψ. Since M|〈w,ϕ〉|〈w,ψ〉 is a submodel of M|〈w,ϕ〉, we obtain 〈w, v〉 ∈
M|〈w,ϕ〉. Consequently, it holds that M, v 6 ϕ, thus, M|〈w,ϕ〉, v  ψ. So we have
arrived at a contradiction.
Next we consider the second case. By 〈w, v〉 ∈ M|〈w,↓y(ϕ∨@x[−ϕ]@yψ)〉, it holds that
M, v  ¬ϕ∧@x[−ϕ]@y¬ψ where v ∈ V (y). Then we know 〈w, v〉 ∈ M|〈w,ϕ〉. Besides,
by 〈w, v〉 6∈ M|〈w,ϕ〉|〈w,ψ〉, we obtainM|〈w,ϕ〉, v 6 ψ that entails a contradiction.
1Actually, the principle for [− ] is not necessary to show a complete set of recursion axioms, cf. [10].
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Note that some operators of H(↓) occur in (6). From Definition 6, we know that it is
equivalent with some formula ofH(↓). Consider formula ↓ x[− ↓ y(ϕ∨@x[−ϕ]@yψ)]χ.
By the semantics, that it is true at a pointed model 〈M, w〉 means that w is χ in the model
M|〈w,↓y(ϕ∨@x[−ϕ]@yψ)〉, where V (x) = {w}. Intuitively, the new model is obtained by
removing all links from w to the points that are ϕ, and to the points which are ψ after
removing the links from w to ϕ-points. This is exactly what [−ϕ][−ψ]χ states.
We now move to the case for 2. It seems like that the following result will work:
Fact 7. For each [−ϕ]2ψ ∈ Ld, the following equivalence holds:
[−ϕ]2ψ ↔↓ x2 ↓ y(¬ϕ→ @x[−ϕ]@yψ) (7)
where x and y are new nominal variables.
Proof. Let 〈M, w〉 be a pointed model. For the direction from left to right, we suppose
that M, w  [−ϕ]2ψ and M, w 6↓ x2 ↓ y(¬ϕ → @x[−ϕ]@yψ). Then it holds
that w (∈ V (x)) has a successor v (∈ V (y)) such that M, v  ¬ϕ ∧ @x[−ϕ]@y¬ψ.
From M, w  [−ϕ]2ψ, it follows that M|〈w,ϕ〉, w  2ψ. Since M, v  ¬ϕ, we
obtain 〈w, v〉 ∈ M|〈w,ϕ〉. Thus it holds that M|〈w,ϕ〉, v  ψ. Besides, M, v  ¬ϕ ∧
@x[−ϕ]@y¬ψ entailsM, w  [−ϕ]@y¬ψ. Consequently, it holds thatM|〈w,ϕ〉, v  ¬ψ,
which entails a contradiction.
For the converse direction, we assume that M, w ↓ x2 ↓ y(¬ϕ → @x[−ϕ]@yψ)
andM, w 6 [−ϕ]2ψ. Then there exists v ∈W such that 〈w, v〉 ∈ R\({w}×V (ϕ)) and
M|〈w,ϕ〉, v  ¬ψ. Consider the case where w and v are named as x and y respectively.
It holds thatM|〈w,ϕ〉, w  @y¬ψ. So we obtainM|〈w,ϕ〉, w  @x[−ϕ]@y¬ψ. Further
more, from 〈w, v〉 ∈ R \ ({w} × V (ϕ)), we know 〈w, v〉 ∈ R andM, v  ¬ϕ. Thus it
is conclude thatM, w 6↓ x2 ↓ y(¬ϕ→ @x[−ϕ]@yψ).
In formula (7), that ↓ x2 ↓ y(¬ϕ → @x[−ϕ]@yψ) is true at 〈M, w〉 says that for
each point v, if v ∈ R(w) and v is not ϕ, then v is ψ after deleting all links from w to the
ϕ-points. However, although formula (7) is valid, it is not the solution: the formula of the
form @x[−ϕ]@yψ blocks the recursion format, even though we have that
Fact 8. For any p ∈ P, Ld-formulas ϕ, ψ and χ, and nominal variable x, the following
equivalences hold:
[−ϕ]@xp↔ @xp (8)
[−ϕ]@x¬ψ ↔ ¬[−ϕ]@xψ (9)
[−ϕ]@x(ψ ∧ χ)↔ [−ϕ]@xψ ∧ [−ϕ]@xχ (10)
[−ϕ]@x2ψ ↔↓ y@x2 ↓ z(¬(ϕ ∧@xy)→ @y[−ϕ]@zψ) (11)
where y and z are new nominal variables.
Proof. The validity of (8)-(10) is straightforward. We now consider (11). Let 〈M, w〉
be a pointed model. From left to right. Suppose thatM, w  [−ϕ]@x2ψ andM, w 6↓
y@x2 ↓ z(¬(ϕ∧@xy)→ @y[−ϕ]@zψ). Let u be a point such that V (x) = {u}. Then it
holds thatM, u  3 ↓ z(¬(ϕ∧@xy)∧@y[−ϕ]@z¬ψ)wherew ∈ V (y). Therefore there
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exists some point v such that Ruv, v ∈ V (z) andM, v  ¬(ϕ ∧@xy) ∧@y[−ϕ]@z¬ψ.
ByM, v  ¬(ϕ ∧ @xy), it holds that 〈u, v〉 ∈ M|〈w,ϕ〉. FromM, v  @y[−ϕ]@z¬ψ,
we obtainM|〈w,ϕ〉, v  ¬ψ, which contradicts toM, w  [−ϕ]@x2ψ.
From right to left. Suppose thatM, w ↓ y@x2 ↓ z(¬(ϕ ∧ @xy) → @y[−ϕ]@zψ)
and M, w 6 [−ϕ]@x2ψ. Let u be a point such that V (x) = {u}. Then there exists
some point v such that 〈u, v〉 ∈ M|〈w,ϕ〉 andM|〈w,ϕ〉, v  ¬ψ. FromM, w ↓ y@x2 ↓
z(¬(ϕ ∧@xy)→ @y[−ϕ]@zψ), it holds thatM, v  @y[−ϕ]@zψ where w ∈ V (y) and
v ∈ V (z). Consequently, we haveM|〈w,ϕ〉, v  ψ that entails a contradiction.
In the rest of this section, we are not going to present a solution for this issue. Actu-
ally we conjecture that there exists no a recursion axiom for [−ϕ]2ψ in H(↓), which is
contrasted with our initial intuition. However, given Corollary 1, there must be some sort
of recursion axioms for it. Thus a question arises:
Open Problem. Could there be a complete set of recursion axioms for SdML?
Through the above considerations, we understandwhyH(↓) fails to do the job. In fact,
there may be no easy solution, short of going to full first-order logic. All this suggests
that, despite the axiomatizability in principle (as observed in Section 3), the structure
of the logical validities of SdML is computationally complex. This suspicion will be
confirmed in the next section, where we prove the undecidability of the logic.
6 Undecidability of SdML
Up to now, we have already shown that SdML is more expressive than the standard modal
logic. Meanwhile, it is also a fragment of the hybrid logicH(↓). It is well-known that the
satisfiability problem for the standard modal logic is decidable. While, as noted in [13],
H(↓) is undecidable. So, is SdML decidable or not?
Actually, there are some fragments of H(↓) that are decidable. For instance, [15]
shows that after removing all formulas containing a nesting of 2, ↓ and 2,H(↓) becomes
decidable. But in this section, we will present a negative answer to the question above,
i.e., the satisfiability problem for SdML is undecidable. Moreover, we will identify the
source of its high complexity. Before these results, we first show that SdML lacks both
the tree model property and the finite model property.
Theorem 6. The logic SdML does not have the tree model property.
Proof. Consider the following formulas:
(R1) p ∧3p ∧3¬p
(R2) 2(p→ 3p ∧3¬p)
(R3) [−¬p]22p
Let ϕr := (R1 ∧ R2 ∧R3). We now show that, for anyM = {W,R, V } and w ∈ W , if
M, w  ϕr, then the evaluation point w is reflexive. By (R1), w has some p-successor(s)
and some ¬p-successor(s). Formula (R2) states that each its p-successor w1 also has at
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least one p-successorw2 and at least one¬p-successorw3. From (R3)we know that, after
deleting all links from w to the ¬p-points, w1 does not have ¬p-successors any longer. If
node w1 is not w, then ϕr cannot be true at w. That is to say, for each v ∈W , if Rwv and
M, v  p, then v = w, i.e., R(w) ∩ V (p) = {w}. So if formula ϕr is true, the evaluation
point must be reflexive (with at least one ¬p-successor). A model for ϕr is theM2 in the
proof of Fact 1, and ϕr is true at the point v1.
In addition, SdML also lacks the finite model property. To show this, inspired by the
methods of [13], we will construct a ‘spy point’, i.e., a special point which has access in
one step to any reachable point in the model.
Theorem 7. The logic SdML does not have the finite model property.
Proof. Let ϕ∞ be the conjunction of the following formulas:
(F1) s ∧ p ∧ 2¬s ∧3p ∧3¬p ∧2(¬p→ 2⊥)
(F2) 2(p→ 3s ∧3¬s ∧ 2p)
(F3) 2(p→ 2(s→ 2¬s ∧3¬p))
(F4) [−¬p]22(s→ ¬3¬p)
(F5) 2(p→ 2(¬s→ 3s ∧3¬s ∧ 2p))
(F6) 2(p→ 2(¬s→ 2(s→ 2¬s ∧3¬p)))
(F7) [−¬p]22(¬s→ 2(s→ ¬3¬p))
(Spy) 2(p→ 2(¬s→ [−¬s]23(p ∧ 2s)))
(Irr) 2(p→ [−s]23s)
(No-3cyc) ¬3(p ∧ [−s]3[−s]33(¬s ∧2¬s))
(Trans) 2(p→ [−s]22(¬s→ [−¬s]23(2¬s ∧32s)))
First, we show that the formula ϕ∞ is satisfiable. Consider the following modelM:
ws,p
v0 v1 v2
w0
p
w1
p
w2
p
w3
p
· · ·
clearly,M, w  ϕ∞. Thus there exists at least one model satisfying formula ϕ∞.
Next, we show that for anyM = {W,R, V } and w ∈ W , ifM, w  ϕ∞, thenW is
infinite. For brevity, define that B = {v ∈ W |v ∈ R(w) ∩ V (p)}, i.e., B is the set of the
p-successors of w. In the following proof, we assume that all previous conjuncts hold.
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By (F1), the evaluation pointw is (s∧p), and it cannot see any s-points. In particular,
w cannot see itself. Besides, w has some p-successor(s) (i.e., B 6= ∅) and some ¬p-
successor(s) (i.e., R(w) \B 6= ∅). In addition, each point in R(w) \B is a dead end.
From formula (F2), we know that each element inB can see some (s∧p)-point(s) and
(¬s ∧ p)-point(s), but cannot see any ¬p-points. Hence each point in B has a successor
distinct from itself.
According to formula (F3), for any w1 ∈ B, each its s-successor can see some ¬p-
point(s), but cannot see any s-points.
By (F4), after removing all links from w to ¬p-points, for each w1 ∈ B, each of its
s-successors w2 has no ¬p-successors. Thus (F4) shows that each w1 ∈ B can see point
w, and that for each s-point w2 ∈W , if w2 is a successor of w1, then w2 must be w.
Formulas (F2)-(F4) show the properties of the (¬s ∧ p)-points which are accessible
from the point w in one step. Similarly, formulas (F5), (F6) and (F7) play the same
role as (F2), (F3) and (F4) respectively, but focusing on showing the properties of the
(¬s∧p)-points that are accessible fromw in two steps. In particular, (F7) guarantees that
every (¬s ∧ p)-point w1 which is accessible from w in two steps can also see w, and that
for each s-point w2 ∈W , if w2 is a successor of w1, then w2 must be w.
Formula (Spy) says that, for each (¬s ∧ p)-point w1 that is accessible from w in two
steps, after removing the links from w1 to the ¬s-points, each successor w2 of w1 has
a p-successor w3 that only has s-successors. Besides, point w2 must be s. By (F7), we
know that w2 = w. In addition, by (F2), w3 should have some ¬s-successor(s) if the cut
induced by [−s] does not take place at w3. So it holds that w3 = w1. In such a way, (Spy)
makes the evaluation point w be a spy-point, and it ensures that each (¬s ∧ p)-point w1
which is accessible from w in two steps is also accessible from w in one step. By (Irr),
for each w1 ∈ B, after removing the link from w1 to w, each its successor still can see w.
Therefore each w1 ∈ B is irreflexive. Besides, (No-3cyc) disallows cycles of length 2 or
3 in B, and (Trans) forces the accessibility relation R to transitively orderB.
Hence B is an unbounded strict partial order, thus it is infinite and so isW . Now we
have already shown that ϕ∞ is satisfiable, and that for each pointed model 〈M, w〉, if
M, w  ϕ∞, thenM is an infinite model. This completes the proof.
Now, by encoding the N ×N tiling problem, we show that SdML is undecidable. A
tile t is a 1 × 1 square, of fixed orientation, with colored edges right(t), left(t), up(t) and
down(t). TheN×N tiling problem is: given a finite set of tile types T , is there a function
f : N ×N → T such that right(f(n,m))=left(f(n+1,m)) and up(f(n,m))=down(f(n,m+1))?
This problem is known to be undecidable (see [20]).
Following the ideas in [13], we will use three modalities3s, 3u and3r. Correspond-
ingly, a modelM = {W,Rs, Ru, Rr, V } now has three kinds of accessibility relations.
We will construct a spy point over the relation Rs. The relations Ru and Rr represent
moving up and to the right, respectively, from one tile to the other. Besides, the operator
[− ] will work in the usual way, i.e., all of the three kinds of relations should be cut if the
current point have some particular successors via them.2 Let us see the details.
2There is also no problem if we use three kinds of dynamic operators that correspond to the three kinds of
accessibility relations respectively. In the proof of Theorem 8, these three kinds of links are disjoint.
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Theorem 8. The satisfiability problem for SdML is undecidable.
Proof. Let T = {T1, ..., Tn} be a finite set of tile types. For each Ti ∈ T , we use u(Ti),
d(Ti), l(Ti), r(Ti) to represent the colors of its up, down, left and right edges respectively.
Besides, we code each tile type with a fixed propositional atom ti. Now we will define a
formulaϕT such that ϕT is satisfiable iff T tilesN×N . Consider the following formulas:
(M1) s ∧ p ∧ 2s¬s ∧3sp ∧3s¬p ∧ 2s(¬p→ 2s⊥)
(M2) 2s(p→ 3s⊤ ∧2s(s ∧3s¬p))
(M3) [−¬p]2s2s(s ∧ ¬3s¬p)
(M4) 2s(p→ 3†⊤ ∧2†(¬s ∧ p ∧3s⊤ ∧ 2s(s ∧3s¬p))) † ∈ {u, r}
(M5) [−¬p]2s2†2s¬3s¬p † ∈ {u, r}
(M6) 2s(p→ 2†(3u⊤ ∧3r⊤ ∧2u(¬s ∧ p) ∧ 2r(¬s ∧ p))) † ∈ {u, r}
(M7) 2s(p→ [−s]2†(3ss ∧ ¬3†¬3ss)) † ∈ {u, r}
(Spy) 2s(p→ 2†[−¬s]2s3s(p ∧ 2u⊥ ∧ 2r⊥)) † ∈ {u, r}
(Func) 2s(p→ [−s]2†[−¬s]3s3s(p ∧ ¬3ss ∧3†⊤∧
2†(2u⊥ ∧ 2r⊥)) † ∈ {u, r}
(No-UR) 2s(p→ [−s]2u2r3ss ∧ [−s]2r2u3ss)
(No-URU) 2s(p→ [−s]2u2r2u3ss)
(Conv) 2s(p→ [−s]3u[−s]3r[−¬s]3s3s(p ∧ ¬3ss∧
2r(3u⊤ ∧3r⊤) ∧3u¬3ss ∧3r3u(2u⊥ ∧ 2r⊥)))
(Unique) 2s(p→
∨
1≤i≤n
ti ∧
∧
1≤i<j≤n
(ti → ¬tj))
(Vert) 2s(p→
∧
1≤i≤n
(ti → 3u
∨
1≤j≤n, u(Ti)=d(Tj)
tj))
(Horiz) 2s(p→
∧
1≤i≤n
(ti → 3r
∨
1≤j≤n, r(Ti)=l(Tj)
tj))
Define ϕT as the conjunction of the formulas above. LetM = {W,Rs, Ru, Rr, V }
be an arbitrary model and w ∈ W . We first analyze the effects of the stated formulas on
what this model must look like.
More concretely, suppose thatM, w  ϕT . We show thatM is a tiling of N × N .
For brevity, define G := {v ∈ W |v ∈ Rs(w) ∩ V (p)} where Rs(w) = {v ∈ W |Rswv},
and we will use its elements to represent the tiles. In the following proof, we also assume
that all previous conjuncts hold.
Formula (M1) is similar to (F1) occurring in the proof of Theorem 7, except that
(M1) focuses on the relation Rs only.
By (M2), each tile w1 has some successor(s) via the relation Rs, and each such suc-
cessor w2 is (s∧p) and also has some (¬s∧¬p)-successor(s) via Rs. It is worthy to note
that formulas (M1) and (M2) illustrate that Rs is irreflexive.
Formula (M3) ensures that each tile w1 can see w via Rs, and that for each (s ∧ p)-
point w2 ∈W , if w2 is accessible from w1 via Rs, then w2 = w.
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(M4) states that each tile has some successor(s) viaRu and some successor(s) viaRr.
Besides, each point that is accessible from a tile via Ru or Rr is very similar to a tile: it
is (¬s ∧ p), and has some (s ∧ p)-successor(s) w1 via relation Rs where each w1 can see
some (¬s ∧ ¬p)-point(s) via Rs.
By formula (M5), each w1 ∈ W accessible from a tile viaRu orRr can see w byRs.
Also, for each (s ∧ p)-point w2 ∈W , if it is accessible from w1 via Rs, then w2 = w.
Formula (M6) ensures that each w1 ∈ W that is accessible from some tile via Ru or
Rr also has some successor(s) via Ru and some successor(s) via Rr. Besides, each its
successor via Ru or Rr is (¬s ∧ p).
From formula (M7), it follows that both Ru and Rr are irreflexive and asymmetric.
By (Spy), we know that the evaluation point w is a spy point via the relation Rs.
Note that formula (M4) says that each tile has some tile(s) above it and some tile(s) to
its right. Now, with (Func), we have that each tile has exactly one tile above it and exactly
one tile to its right.
By (No-UR), no tile can be above/below as well as to the left/right of another tile.
Formula (No-URU) disallows cycles following successive steps of the Ru, Rr, and Ru
relations, in this order. Further more, (Conv) ensures that the tiles are arranged as a grid.
Formula (Unique) guarantees that each tile has a unique type. (Vert) and (Horiz) force
the colors of the tiles to match properly.
Thus we conclude thatM is indeed a tiling of N ×N .
Next we show the other direction required for our proof. Suppose the function f :
N ×N → T is a tiling ofN ×N . Define a modelM = {W,Rs, Ru, Rr, V } as follows:
W = (N ×N) ∪ {w, v}
Rs = {〈w, v〉} ∪ {〈w, n〉 | n ∈ N} ∪ {〈n,w〉 | n ∈ N}
Ru = {〈〈n,m〉, 〈n,m+ 1〉〉 | n,m ∈ N}
Rr = {〈〈n,m〉, 〈n+ 1,m〉〉 | n,m ∈ N}
V (s) = {w}
V (p) = {w} ∪N
V (ti) = {〈n,m〉 ∈ N ×N | f(〈n,m〉) = Ti}, for each i ∈ {1, ..., n}
V (q) = ∅, for any other propositional atoms q
In particular, w is a spy point inM. By construction, we know thatM, w  ϕT .
Thus, perhaps surprisingly, given the simple-looking syntax and semantics of SdML,
the complexity of its logic is high. What is the reason for this high complexity, as con-
trasted with decidability of dynamic-epistemic logics of link deletion [11]? For SML, the
reason offered by [5] is the stepwise nature of link deletion, and this is confirmed by the
result in [1] showing how a very simple stepwise variant of public announcement logic
is undecidable. However, our case is different, since links are cut in a uniform definable
way: the only remaining potential culprit is then the locality.
To see the effects of this feature, recall the above formula (7). We already saw in Sec-
tion 5.2 that a formula of the form @x[−ϕ]@yψ blocks the recursion format. In contrast,
Losing Connection: the Modal Logic of Definable Link Deletion 23
consider a global version S
g
dML of SdML. The truth condition for [− ] now reads:
〈W,R, V 〉, w  [−ϕ]ψ iff 〈W,R \ {〈s, t〉 ∈ R | M, t  ϕ}, V 〉, w  ψ.
Given the global change made in this semantics, here is a valid recursion axiom for 2:
[−ϕ]2ψ ↔ 2(¬ϕ→ [−ϕ]ψ).
Indeed, following the general method for modal logics of definable model change pre-
sented in [11], one can find a complete set of recursion axioms for S
g
dML:
Fact 9. The logic S
g
dML is axiomatizable and decidable.
The complexity effect of the local behavior of SdML also show at a crucial step in
our proof of undecidability. In the proof of Theorem 8, formula (Conv) forces the tiles to
satisfy a first-order convergence property, i.e.,
∀t∀t1∀t2(Rutt1 ∧Rrt1t2 → ∃t3(Rrtt3 ∧Rut3t2)).
As noted in [8], this property can give logics high complexity.
By contrast, convergence is not definable in S
g
dML, even though we expand the model
with some extra tools, e.g. a spy point. Roughly speaking, given two tiles t1 and t2
that have same properties, we still can distinguish between them with SdML, say, their
properties will be different after cutting some links starting from t1; however, we cannot
do this with S
g
dML, since links are cut in a global way.
3
The more general issue arising here goes beyond our specific logics of sabotage.
Open Problem. Does making update operations local (world-relative) generate undecid-
ability in general for decidable dynamic-epistemic logics?
This would provide an alternative diagnosis to the comparison of sabotage and update
offered in [5], closer to the modified dynamic-epistemic logics studied in [7].
7 Related Work
This article is primarily inspired by existing work on sabotage games [10] and their appli-
cations. A good source for the latest developments in sabotage modal logics is [5], which
also has extensive references to current work on related modal logics for definable graph
change. Meanwhile, a number of authors have studied other graph games using match-
ing modal logics. For instance, in poison games, originating in graph theory, instead of
deleting links, a player can poison a node, to make it inaccessible to her opponent. Poison
games have been recently studied in the modal logics of [23], using the close similarities
between these systems and variants of so-called memory logics [22] in the hybrid tradi-
tion. In another tradition, that of Boolean network games, [25] has proposed a logic of
local fact change which can characterize Nash equilibria, providing a new way of looking
at the interaction between graph games, network games and logics of control.
3From a technical point of view, to show that S
g
d
ML cannot define the convergence property, we need its
notion of bisimulation, which is easily defined.
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Throughout the paper, dynamic-epistemic logic [6, 9] has been used as a decidable
contrasting design to our systems. Technically, our logic SdML has resemblances to sev-
eral recent logics for local announcements. [7] introduces a logic to characterize both
global and local announcements. Similar to our set-up, it has definable updates of links,
but there is also a difference. Although more expressive than public announcement logic,
this logic is decidable. Moreover, we are inspired by other logics for local graphmodifiers,
too. For instance, [3] investigates a special type of local SML, whose dynamic operator
refers to a model transition that cuts a link from the current state and then evaluates a
formula at the target of the deleted arrow. Finally, more akin to the above-mentioned [25],
[4] studies local modifiers that update the valuation at the evaluation point, and shows that
adding those modifiers dramatically increases the expressive power of the logic.
Next, a highly relevant line of research for this article is hybrid logic, an area from
which we have taken several basic techniques. As far as we know, [13] is the first to
present the method of constructing a spy point, the main tool that was used to prove the
undecidability of our logic SdML. [2] shows how relation-changing logics such as SML
can be seen as fragments of hybrid logics, and identifies various decidable fragments of
those logics with the help of hybrid translations. This fits with our findings in Section 5.1.
Finally, [19] merges hybrid logic with public announcement logic. Differently from the
operator [−] in SdML, the announcementmodality there operates in a global way, making
it possible to axiomatize the logic by means of recursion axioms.
It remains to note that this article fits with the general program recently proposed in
[12] for a much broader study of analysis and design for graph games in tandem with
matching modal logics. In particular, it proposed various meaningful new games, and
identified general questions behind the match between logic and game.
8 Summary and Further Directions
In this article, we started with a definable sabotage game SdG that models some inter-
esting phenomena in everyday life, and explored a matching logical system, definable
sabotage modal logic SdML. We presented a first-order translation for the logic, showed
a characterization theorem with regard to a novel notion of definable sabotage bisimula-
tion, probed an axiomatization for SdML using recursion axioms in an extended hybrid
language, and finally, we proved its undecidability.
Immediate technical open problems for our logic SdML resemble those in the liter-
ature for SML. For instance, we would like to have a good Hilbert-style proof theory,
which may perhaps be found by analyzing semantic tableaux for SdML. Another open
problem is the complexity of the schematic validities of our language.
Next, while our language can define winning positions for players in given finite
graphs, it cannot express generic winning conditions across models. To obtain the latter,
we need a modal µ-calculus enriched with our local definable deletion modality, whose
behavior shows the complexities already noted for sabotage µ-calculus in [5].
In terms of generality, one would like to establish the precise connections between our
logic SdM and other modal logics for graph games in the cited literature. For instance, the
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difference in expressive power that we noted in Section 4 between SdML and SML does
not preclude the existence of faithful embeddings either way.
As a final technical issue, we mentioned the contrast between locality and stepwise
link deletion as sources of undecidability, discussed in Section 6. One could also merge
these in a stepwise version of our logic, denoted SsdML. Clearly, its validities are different
from those of SdML: for instance, [−] is no longer self-dual. Our methods from Section
6 should also be able to prove its undecidability, but we have not yet been able to do so.
We end by stepping back to reality. In our introduction, we mentioned social networks
[21], where adding links (gaining friends or neighbors) is as important as deleting links
(losing friends or neighbors). A connection between our logic and existing logics for
social networks, and games played over these, would be a natural next step.
Another such step toward greater realism would arise when making connections to
more elaborate versions of our game scenarios, for instance involving more complex
independent goals for players than we have considered, or imperfect information when
players cannot perfectly observe each other’s moves. In general, such games may have
probabilistic equilibria, and our logics would have to acquire interfaces with probability.
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